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the ancillary administrator, are not taxable in the state of the
ancillary forum.
(f.) Stocks of corporations follow the person of the owner, and
are taxed at the place of his residence.
(g.) Ships are likewise taxable at the residence of the owner,
which is generally that of the home port, or place of registry ; although when they are in different states the residence of the owner
governs.
(ht.) The rule as to debts not negotiable being taxed at the residence of the owner is modified, to the extent that where a person
residing in one state, has an agent in another, who loans or invests
money for him, holds the evidences of debt, and so invests the
proceeds of the loans when collected in the same state, it is held
then to be taxable at the residence of the agent.
W. H. B.
NORFOLK, Va.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

S.upreme Court of Errorsof Connecticut.
WILLIAM W. WELCH v. THE BOSTON AND ALBANY RAILROAD
COMPANY.
The defendants, a railroad company, claimed to be exempt from liability for an
injury to a horse transported upon their road, by reason of a stipulation in the hill
of lading that they were not to be liable for any one of certain specified injuries or
causes of injury to any animal thus carried. The court charged the jury that they
-were still liable for any injury caused by want of ordinary care on their part.
Held, that the charge was correct.
A stipulation by a hailee for hlre for exemption from the consequences of his
own negligence, has no validity.
There may, however, be a valid stipulation for a degree of responsibility less
than that imposed by law.
Where a stipulation in such a case was open to a question as to whether it intended an exemption from all liability or only a limitation of the common-law
liability, and the judge charged the jury that it was void, but that the defendants
would be liable only for want of ordinary care, it was held that the defendants
were not injured by the charge of the judge that the stipulation was void, even if
it were not so, since lie held them only to the degree of liability to which they
would have been held under any construction of it.

CASE, against the defendants as common carriers, for an injury

to a horse carried by them.
On the trial, it was proved that the plaintiff, at Whitesboro', New
York, delivered the horse to the New York Central Railroad Coin-
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pany for transportation, with a card attached to his halter, marked
' Dr. William W. Welch, care of Dr. Stillman, Millert6n, N. Y."
The railroad company received the horse and signed a bill of
lading for him. The plaintiff, at the same time, by his agent, A.
B. Smith, signed the following document, known as a "stock

release."
"New York Central Railroad, Whitesboro' Station, Feb'v 27th 1873. Memo-.
randum of an agreement made this day, between the New York Central Railroad
Company of the first part, by their station-agent at the above-named station, and A.
B. Smith, agent, of Whitesboro', of the second part: Whereas, the said New York
Central Railrorad Company transports live stock only at first-class rates as per
tariff, excepting where they transport them at a reduced rate in consideration of
the owner or shipper assuming certain risks as specified below : Now, in consideration that the said railroad company will transport for the party of the second
part such live stock at the reduced rate of 55b cents per hundred lbs., the said
party of the second part does hereby agree that the party of the first part shall not,
under any circumstances, nor for any cause, be held liable beyond the sum of
$200 for injury to or loss of any single animal carried pursuant to this agreement,
although the actual value of such animal may exceed that amount.; and said party
of the second part also agrees to take the risk of injuries which the aninmtls or
either of them may receive in consequence of any of them being wild, vicious,
unruly, weak, escaping or maiming themselves or each other, or from delays, or
in consequence of heat, suffocation, or of being crowded, or on account of being
injured, whether such injury shall be caused by the burning of hay, straw or any
other material used for feeding said animals, or otherwise, and for any damage
occasioned thereby, and also all risk of any loss or damage which may be sustained by reason of any delay in such transportation. And said party of the
second part also agrees to examine the cars in which such animals are carried
and to take all risk against accidents, injuries or damages that may happen in
consequence of insecurity or defect (if any there may be) in the floor, frame or
doors of the cars. * * * And this agreement further witnesseth, that the said
party of the second part has this day delivered to said railroad company one horse
to be transported to Millerton, N. Y., on the conditions ahove expressed. By
S. PURDY,Station Agent."
Harlem R. R. Albany.

It was proved that the plaintiff did not read this instrument.

There was no evidence that the railroad company made any
deduction from its first-class rates as a consideration of this release,
except as appears from the instrument itself, and the plaintiff

claimed he paid the highest rates.
It was agreed that the regular line of transportation from
Whitesboro' to Millerton was by the Central Railroad from Whitesboro' to East Albany, and thence to Chatham by the defendant's
railroad, and from there to Millerton by the Harlem Railroad.
The horse was transported by the Central Railroad Company

from Whitesboro' to East Albany, and there, with the card attached to his halter, and with the stock release, was delivered to
the defendants, who transported the horse over their railroad "from
East Albany to Chatham. The defendants gave the plaintiff a bill
of freight for the horse, stating the place to which he was to be
transported.
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When the horse arrived at Chatham he was found to have been
injured.

The plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed that

he had proved that the horse received his injuries while in the
custody of the defendants for transportation, but the defendants
denied this.
The court instructed the jury that the defendants were common
carriers, and as such might to some extent limit their liability by
special contract, but that the law did not permit common carriers
to exempt themselves from the exercise of ordinary care and diligence in the discharge of their duties, and that the stock release
was void as stipulating for total exemption from liability. And
that if they should find that the plaintiff's horse was injured on
the defendants' railroad, or while in the custody of the defendants
for transportation, from the want of ordinary care and diligence
on the part of the defendants, in such case the defendants would
be liable, notwithstanding the release, and their verdict should be
for the plaintiff. But that if they should find that the horse was
not injured on the defendants' railroad, nor while in their custody
for transportation, then their verdict should be for the defendants;
or, if they should find that the horse was injured while in the
defendants' "custody for transportation, or while being transported
on their railroad, but without any want of ordinary care and diligence on their part, then in such case their verdict should be for
the defendants.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendants
moved for a new trial, for error in the charge of the court.
-E. IF. Seymour, in support of the motion.
Andrews and Hardenbergh, contrA.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOSTER, J.-The controlling legal question, and the only im-

portant one in £his case, is, what were the liabilities incurred on
the part of these defendants, to this plaintiff, in the transportation
of'this horse ? Were those liabilities such as are attached to conmon carriers by the common law, or were they such only as were
created by special contract entered into between the parties ?
The plaintiff, for certain reasons assigned by him, prayed the
court to lay the special contract, set up by the defendants, out of
the case; the defendants insisted that the same was a good and
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valid agreement between the plaintiff and the Central Railroad
Company; that the defendants were entitled to the same limitation
of liabilities and duties under it, as had been stipulated for by the
Central Railroad Company; and that the duties and liabilities of
the defendants, in respect to the transportation of the horse, were
not those by law imposed 6n common carriers.
The court charged the jury that the special contract insisted on
by the defendants as the measure of their liability, was void, as
stipulatiug for a total exemption from all liability.
If such was the character of this special contract, we are of
opinion that the court was correct in pronouncing it void. We
cannot recognise the validity of an agreement to exempt a party
from all liability, where he fails to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the business in which he engages. It is revolting to the
moral sense, and contrary alike to the salutary principles of law
and a sound public policy, to allow a bailee for hiro-to stipulate for
exemption from the consequences of his o'n carelessness and
negligence.
But the defendants claim that the special contract set up by them
was a limitation of their common law liability, riot an exemption
from all liability. That it was competent to the parties in this suit
to stipulate for a diminished degree of responsibility from that imposed by law on common carriers, we have no doubt. Whether
the construction put on this special contract, in the court below,
was correct or not, we think the defendants have no just ground
of complaint, when we look at the manner in which the case was
finally put to the jury. By the charge, the liability of the defendants was for ordinary care only. The jury were told that if
they should find that the plaintiff's horse was injured on the defend
ants' road, or while in their custody for transportation, from want
of ordinary care and diligence on their part, the defendants would
be liable. But unless they should find such an injury so received
on the defendants' road, or while the horse was in their custody
for transportation, or if they found such injury was so received,
but without any want of ordinary care and diligence on their part,
then their verdict should be for the defendants.
The responsibility of the defendants was thus made no more
weighty than that required by law to be of perpetual obligation.
If this special contract relieved from all liability, it was void. If
it limited responsibility to the exercise of ordinary care, and no
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construction can be more favorable to the defendants, the defendants have the benefit of their contract, for that was the extent of

the liability to which they were subjected under the charge of the
court. A bailee, without ieward, is responsible for such care as a
prudent man takes of his own property; in other words, for ordinary care. The defendants surely cannot complain when held to

no higher degree of responsibility.
It is unnecessary to pursue this discussion. The Supreme Court
of the United States, in the recent case of Railroad Co. v. Locktrood, 17 Wallace 357, had the law bearing upon this subject

under consideration.

The leading English and American authori-

ties were fully examined, in a very elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice
BRADLEY. We coincide in the views therein expressed.
There should be no new trial.
The question decided in this case must
be regarded by all, as one of paramount
importance, in regard to one of the most
extensive and important matters of business in the country, that of transportation in all modes. For, if carriers can
make valid contracts, throwing all the
evil consequences of their own negligence, and that of theiremployees, upon
the persons and owners of things carried, there will always be found ready
means of obtaining such contracts from
those to be affected by them. It would,
11o doubt, be far better policy to extend
the same rule of diligence now required
in passenger-transportation, to that of
goods, and to allow no qualification of
it, by either notices or special contracts.
But we must accept the law of carriers
of goods as we find it, handed down to
us from a former age, whose demands
for security in transportation, led to
the adoption of a rule of responsibility
fr carriers, which has no precise parallel In any other business, 'or any just
foundation in reason or justice, as
applied to any business at the present
day. The conviction of the unreasonahleness of the rule, probably has led
the courts to allow, and to enforce
all manner of exceptions to it, till we

are in danger of bringing the law into
even a worse dondition than if the original rule,' with all its stringency, had
been rigidly adhered to, as the courts, at
first, inclined to do. ,
The actual present state of opinion
upon the leading question involved, is
not fully stated perhaps in the foregoing
case. As we understand that matter,
after pretty careful and thorough examination, the English courts now hold that
there is no invincible objection to allowing the carrier to stipulate with the owner
or consignor of goods, for exemption
from all responsibility in the transportation, as *ell from the negligence of
themselves or their servants and employees. This is distinctly held in the
very late case of Gallin v. London 4 N.
IW. Ry., 23 W. R. 308; Law Rep. 10
Q. B. 212, where the question is very.
carefully considered and the contract
upheld, where a drover signed a stipnlation to exonerate the company from
all responsibility, as being both valid
upon general principles, and reasonable
under the statute. This will be more
satisfactory than any deductions we
might make from an examination of
the English cases, as to the present
state of the law there, upon the subject.

. WOODRUFF v. PLANT.
The effect of this rule unquestionably
is, to encourage laxness and indifference in carriers, in regard to all the
appliances of the transportation, including the character and condition of
the apparatus of transportation, as well
as the service connected with its optration. This has led the American courts,
generally, to reject all contracts against
responsibility for negligence on the
part of the carriers or their employees,
as being against sound policy and good
morals. But the New York courts have
finally come to the conclusion that such
contracts may be upheld, when expressed in clear and specific language,
as intended to cover the negligence of
the carrier and his employees, but that
no general terms, however exclusive,
will be held to extend so far : Magin
v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168; see, also,
Knell v. Company, 33 N. Y. Superior
Ct. 423. This rule seems even less
satisfactory than the English rule. For
if the parties may lawfully contract for
exemptions from responsibility for the
consequences of their own negligence,
there can be no possible reason why
such an extended rule of construction
should be adopted with reference to that
particular exemption. There is every
reason to suppose the carrier would intend to embrace that exemption above
all others, if he might lawfully do so;
and as the public are now very much at
the mercy of railways and steamboats for

transportation for long distances, there
is nothing improbable in supposing the
owner of goods, or passengers even,
might submit to any conditions demanded. If such contracts are lawful and
. natural, we can conceive no reason why
general terms should not be construed
to embrace that particular exemption
from responsibility, with carriers. But
in Magin v. Dinsmore, supra, Jonaso.,,
J., distinctly declares that, by the settied laws of that state, a contract exa empting the carrier from responsibility
for loss, "from any cause whatever,"
will not extend to losses from the very
causes enumerated in the bill of lading,
when produced by negligence of the
carrier or his employees, but might be
made to embrace them if specifically
named. He cites many New York
cases in support of the view, most of
which do not extend beyond the first
part of the rule declared, in regard to
which there is no controversy in the
American courts. OpenAeimer v. N. S
Express Co., in the Supreme Court of
Illinois, 9 Alb. Law J. 187, not reported in Illinois Reports, is here cited
in favor of the latter part of the rule ; but
we cannot believe it will ever obtain
any very extensive acceptance. The
opinion of Mr. Justice BRADLEY in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wallace 357, is
the best exposition of the law upon
this question we have any where found.
L F. R.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
DAVID P. WOODRUFF v. AMZI P. PLANT.
The holder of a bank check is bound to present it within a reasonable time;
otherwise the delay is at his own peril.
Bet what is a reasonable time must depend upon the particular circumstances of
the case.
And the time may be extended by the assent of the drawer, express or implied.
The plaintiff, desiring to make a remittance to a creditor at a distance, and there
VOL. XXIV.-19
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being no bank in the place where he lived, asked the defendant, who had an
account with a banker in a neighboring city, to take the amount of him in bank
bills and give him his check therefor, and the defendant, fully understanding the
object, took the bank bills and gave the plaintiff his check upon the banker, payable to the plaintiff's order, the defendant the same day depositing the bills with
the hanker. The plaintiff at once endorsed the check to his creditor and sent it by
the next mail. It was three days before the check reached the place where tile
banker resided and was presented for payment, at which time the banker had
faile'd and payment was refused. The plaintiff haying taken up the check sued the
defendant thereon. Held, that the cheek was presented within a reasonable time
in the circumstances, and that the defendant was liable.
The case could not be regarded as one of bailment.

ASSUMPSIT upon a bank chec]f; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford county. The court made a finding of the
facts and reserved the case for the advice of this court. The facts
are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

A. P. Hyde and If. S. Terrill, for the plaintiff, cited, to the
point that the check was presented for payment within a reasonable
time: Bridgeport Bank v. Dyer, 19 Conn. 136: Daggett v. Whiting, 35 Id. 360; 1 Parsons' Notes and Bills 271; 3 Kent Coin.
104, note c.; Taylor v. Wilson, 11 Mete. 44; Ames v. Merriam,
98 Mass. 2,4; First Nat. Bank v. Harris, 108 Id. 514;. 1M1orrison v. Bailey, 5 Ohio St. 13; Mohawk Bank v. Broderick, 13
Wend. 133; Stephens v. McNeill, 26 Barb. 652; Bickford v.
Ridge, 2 Campb. 537 ; Alexander v. Burchfield, 7 M. & G. 1061 ;
Robinson v. Itawsford, 9 Ad. & E., N. S. 51; Hare v. Henty,
10 Coin. Bench, N. S. 64; Prideauz v. Criddle, Law Rep. 4
Queen's Bench 454.
Perkins and H. R. Holcomb, for the defendant, cited, to the
point that the check was not presented in season: 2 Parsons' Notes
and Bills 73, 79; Chitty on Bills 385 et seq.; Story on Bills, § 494;
Byles on Bills 20; Harker v. Anderson, 21 Wend. 372; Chapman v. White, 2 Seld. 412; Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 173; s. c.
52 Id. 545.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOSTER, J.-The parties to this suit resided in Southington,
twenty-two miles from New Raven. They met together on the morning of the 24th of March 1873, and in the settlement of some business transactions, the defendant gave the plaintiff his check for
$40 on E. S. Scranton & Co., a banking company in New Ihaven.
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The plaintiff then requested the defendant to give him another
check for $425, counting out to him bank bills to that amount.
The reason of the request was, that the plaintiff was indebted to
one Goodwin, who resided at Lime Rock, in Litchfield county, to
whom he was about making a remittance, and he preferred to
make it by a check rather than by bills. There was no bank at
Southington. The plaintiff deposited the $40 check that day at a
bank in Meriden, where he kept his bank account, and on the next
day it was presented for payment and duly paid. The defendant
gave the check for $425, as requested, taking bank bills of the
plaintiff for that sum, which, with $125 more, the defendant, on
the same day, deposited with Scranton & Co., on whom the checks
were drawn. The plaintiff, on the same day, enclosed the check
for $425 to his creditor, Goodwin, at Lime Rock, who received it
the next day, the 25th, and immediately deposited it in the National Iron Bank of that village for collection. This bank, by the
next mail after its receipt, sent it to a bank in New Haven for collection, which bank received it on the afternoon of the 26th of
March, and early on the morning of the 27th, presented the same
for payment, which was refused,-the banking house of Scranton
& Co., having failed and closed its doors on the 26th. The check
was duly protested for non-payment, and the requisite notices were
given to all parties. The plaintiff paid Goodwin the amount of
this check, and brings this suit to recover it from the defendant,
who was the drawer.
Is the defendant liable ?'

The defence is rested on two grounds. 1st. That this transaction was really a bailment. And 2d. That the delay in presenting
the check discharged the drawer.
The claim that this transaction was a bailment is certainly not
sustained by the finding. There was no agreement, no understanding between the parties that the defendant took the plaintiff's
money to deposit the same with Scrant6n & Co., giving the plaintiff an order or check to enable him to receive it, and that when
the defendant had done that his liability ended. Both parties
doubtless had entire confidence in the pecuniary responsibility of
Scranton & Co., and whether the defendant deposited with them
the money he received for the check, or paid it out in his business,
or kept it in his pocket, was a matter of entire indifference to the
plaintiff. He probably bestowed not a thought on the subject,
leaving the defendant to make such disposition of the money as
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might best suit his convenience or pleasure. True, the defendant
deposited it, and other money, -with Scranton & Co., on the same
day he received it; but he, also, on the same day, drew out 6485.
There is nothing in the case to support the claim of a bailment;
in fact, that claim has not been very earnestly pressed, as it manifestly could not be, in view of the finding.
We pass to the second ground of defence, the delay in presenting the check for payment. Has that delay discharged the defendant's liability?
The facts on this point have already been stated, but it should
be stated in addition, for the case finds, that the plaintiff told the
defendant when he took the check, that it was to be sent away,
and would not reach the bank in several days. The defendant
replied that the money would be there to meet it. It may also be
added, though perhaps no stress should be laid upon it, that the
defendant's account at this time was some $4000 overdrawn,
There was a deso far as cash deposits were concerned.
posit of bonds against which the defendant was entitled to draw,
and the banking company were authorized to sell the bonds, being
bound to furnish others in place of them when required, the
account of the defendant being made good. These bonds of the
defendant were sold by the banking company, but whether before
or after the check was drawn does not appear. They were not
credited to the defendant till the 26th of March, the day the house
stopped payment. At that time they owed the defendant 999.25,
including this check of $425, for the whole of which sum the defendant duly filed his claim in his own name against the members
of this company in bankruptcy, after the commencement of this suit.
A dividend of twelve and a half cents on the dollar, on their
estate, has been declared, received by the defendant, and tendered
to the plaintiff, who refused to receive the same.
There can be no dispute as to the law regarding the presentment of a check for payment in order to charge the drawer in
case of dishonor. The holder is bound to present it within a reasonable time, and to give notice thereof within a like reasonable
time; otherwise the delay is at his own peril. Story on Prom.
Notes, § 493. This rule it may be said is indefinite, but it seems
impossible to make it more certain and precise. What is a reasonable time will depend upon circumstances, and will, in many
cases, depend upon the time, the mode, and the place, of receiving
the check, and upon the relations of the parties between whom the
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question arises. lb.; AfohawA, Bank v. Broderick, 13 Wend. 133.
Here three days only elapsed between the giving of the check
and its presentment for payment.
The particular circumstances attending this case we consider
very important. The defendant knew that the plaintiff desired
this check to make a remittance ; that it was not to be immediately
presented for payment; and would not reach the bank for several
days. The case of Dag.qett v. 'Wiitney, 35 Conn. 366, is certainly
an authority to show, that what the understanding of the parties
was at the time that the check was drawn and delivered enters into
the contract. That the time for presentment may be extended by
the assent of the drawer, express or implied, is well settled: Alexander v. Burchfield, 7 Man. & Gr. 1061. Here the time for presentment was extended by the assent of the drawer, not for a definite time, certainly, but for a reasonable time; and we are quite
clear that a reasonable time had not expired when this check was
pr6sented for*payment and dishonored.
We think the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and so advise the
Court of Common Pleas.
There is little question in regard to
the soundness of the rule laid down in the
foregoing opinion, but every new illustration of the rule, by a different state
of facts, is useful. A bank check is
more analogous to an inland bill of ex
change, payable at sight, than to any
other of the familiar securities of the old
books, and like most other negotiable
securities, when of comparatively recent
origin, will naturally establish rules
peculiar to its own uses, and with reference to the common practices of business men in regard to it. In Ames v.
Merriman, 98 Mass. 294, BrIE ow, C.
J., treats a check as strictly analogous
to a note, or bill accepted payable on
demand, and gives no intimation of any
distinction in the two cases, in regard to
tho reasonable time for prQsentment.
In Nat. Bank v. Hanee, 108 Mass. 514,
CHAPMAN, C. J., follows the former
case without comment. In strictness,
checks are bills payable at sight; and,
although the elementary treatises seem
to regard notes and bills accepted, pay-

able on demand and at sight, as resting
upon the same grounds, as to what is
reasonable time for presentment : Story
on Promissory Notes, 207 et seq.; Chit.
on Bills, ch. 7, pp. 303 et seq. Yet in
practice, we apprehend that the holder
of a check would, ordinarily, be expected to present it for payment sooner
than in the case of a bill or note payable on demand; and it seems to us not
quite certain, that there is not implied
the necessity for more diligence in presenting securities, payable at sight,
where the presentment is required to fix
the responsibility of the drawer, than
there is where the obligation is fixed
and no demand is necessary to perfect
the cause of fction ; but it is governed
so much by the peculiar circumstances,
that no general rule can be even approximated. In 8mith v. Miller, 43 N.
Y. 172, it was held that where the
plaintiff accepted a check in lien of a
draft, he must present it the same day.
I. F. R.
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Supreme Tudicial Court of Maine.
BEDER PALES v. LUTHER IIEMENWAY ET AL.
An unrestricted reference by rule of court of a suit pending upon a mortgage
gives authority to the referee, if he finds the plaintiff entitled to recover, io determine the amount of the conditional judgment.
'Whcre the mortgage is conditioned to be void upon the fulfilment by the mortgag ors of their obligation to the mortgagee for a life maintenance and other things,
the referee, if he finds a breach of the continuing condition, should make up the

conditional judgment in such sum as in equity and good conscience is a present
equivalent for full performance, including therein prospective as well as past
damages.
WRIT OF ENTRY, originally commenced by Joseph Tolman upon
a mortgage conditioned for his support by the respondents, as is
stated in the opinion.

T. R. Simonton, for the defendants.
A. P. Gould and J. E. Moore, for the plaintiff.
BARROWS, J.-This case comes before us on exceptions to the
report of the referee filed therein and the overruling of the defendants' objections thereto. The suit was originally commenced by
Joseph Tolman, and is a writ of entry upon a mortgage 'given to
him by the respondents, conditioned to be void if they fulfilled
their obligation of same date to maintain him during the term of
his natural life, furnish him with certain comforts and privileges,
and do certain other acts in said obligation specified.
The objections relied on in argument here are that the referee
had no authority to fix the amount for which the conditional judgment should be rendered, and no power to include in such judgment any danages for the breach of the defendant's obligation,
except such as had accrued prior to the commencement of the
action, and especially none for the future support of the mortgagee. * * *

[Here the opinion discusses some points of practice in references
under rule of court, which are omitted as entirely local.]
The referee included in the sum for which the conditional judgment was to be awarded, besides the expense actually incurred for
the support of the mortgagee up to the time of filing his report,
general prospective damages for the breach of the defendant's
obligation.
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Ought the judgment so to be made up in a suit upon a mortgage
conditioned to be void if the mortgagor fulfils an obligaf ion to support the mortgagee during his natural life? When there is a
breach of such an obligation and the mortgagee sues for possession
of the niortgaged estate, shall his damages be assessed once for all,
and the conditional judgment rendered for the amount, or is be
entitled only to a conditional judgment for the cost of his support
up to the time of the commencement of the action or the trial
thereof in court?
It was held in Sibley v. Rider, 54 Maine 466, following the
,doctrine of _Philbrook v. Burgess, 52 Maine 271, that the true
measure of damages, and the sum for which conditional judgment
should be rendered in a suit upon such a mortgage, "is a present
equivalent for full performance; and if the parties submit without
exceptions to a Iess sum, the judgment will nevertheless be conclusive." Satisfaction of it will operate as a complete satisfaction
of the obligation and mortgage, so that no action can subsequently
be maintained upon either. Hard as this may seem in a case
where a party ignorant of his legal rights had had judgment in
such a suit entered up for past damages only, we think a little
reflection will make it clear that the contrary doctrine and practice would so completely deprive the mortgagee of any effectual
remedy as to work still greater injustice.
There seems to have been at one time a doubt whether mortgages of this description were subject to redemption after breach
of the condition; but this court held in Bryant v. Erskine, 55
Maine 157, that they are so.
And this is doubtless right; but it is easy to see that the mortgagee who, as is usual in such cases, has conveyed his whole estate,
relying upon prompt and punctual performance by the mortgagor
for his daily bread, would be in a sorry plight if he were forced to
depend for his means of subsistence upon such credit as the right
to maintain a succession of small suits for the recovery of money
actually advanced would give him.
After paying the expenses of litigation, little would remain for
the support of the obligee.
. On the other hand, the party who receives a conveyance of property upon the strength of his agreement to furnish a life maintenance to the grantor, if required, when he fails to perform his
contract, either to restore the possession of what he has received or
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to furnish the means of making his undertaking good, has no
cause of complaint. He simply abides thenatural and necessary
consequences of his own delinquency.
A review of the question only confirms us in the conviction that
an adherence to the doctrine of Sibley v. R~ider, and Ptilbrookv.
Burgess, ubi supra, will best subserve both law and justice. It
was the duty of the referee, standing as he did in the place of both
judge and jury, to determine not only whether the continuing
agreement of the defendants had been broken, but to ascertain
what sum would be, in equity and good conscience, a present equivalent for full performance; and for such sum it would follow that
a conditional judgment should be entered.
Exceptions overruled.
and PETERS, JJ., concurked.
J., concurred in the result.

WALTON, DANFORTH
VIRGIN,

There is a very important practical,
as well as legal question involved in
this case, but which the court seem to
regard as settled by former decisions of
the court undr statutory provisions.
This class of contracts is very common
in the country, and it seems to us to
involve questions not easy to be dealt
with in many cases. A condition in a
deed of land, dependant upon the performance of a contract for maintenance
or support, in whatever form it is made,
cannot be justly regarded as a mere
mortgage for the security of a pecuniary
obligation. The contract is unquestionably of a fiduciary and personal character, and one which courts of equity will
not relieve against the forfeiture of, by
any means, as matter of course. That
is a matter resting in the discretion of
the court, and dependant upon the circumstances of the particular case, unless
controlled by statute. The conveyance,
depending upon the continued performance of the condition, becomes inoperative upon failure, and a court of equity
will not grant relief, even in the case of
mere non-repair of the premises, where
the neglect has been wilful or long-con-

tinned: Mill v. Barclay, 18 Ves. 56,
where the general question is extensively
discussed by Lord Chancellor ELDoN.
The same rule seems to have been then
well established by the earlier decisions:
Bracebridge v. .Buckley, 2 Price 200;
Eaton v. Jyon, 3 Ves. 693. And stilf,
a covenant to repair, although involving
personal service, is as much susceptible
of pecuniary compensation as almost
any other, and we doubt not a forfeiture
of this kind would ordinarily, in this
country, be relieved against in equity.
But a contract for maintenance and
support is of a very different character.
It is as strictly fiduciary and personal
as any other, and has often been so held.
Hence it has been held that such contracts arenot assignable, as it is of their
very essence that they should he performed by and between the parties to
the contract: BetWleem v. Annis, 40 N.
H. 34. And where the contract was to
pay a debt of a certain amount by supporting the mortgagee for a certain
agreed term, it was held the mortgagee
could not relieve himself from the condition by paying the money : Hawkins
v. Clenient, 15 Mich. 513. But it seems
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to have been held in many of the states
that, where the mortgagee has failed to
perform the condition, equity will relieve
by decreeing an equivalent in money:
Wilder v W]ittemwre, 15 Mass. 262;
AXse v. 1Iske, 20 Pick. 499 ; Beihkeem
v. Anxis, supra. And the cases-cited
in the principal case show that such has
long been the practice in Maine. But
the subject is controlled by statute in
all these states: Hilliard on Mort. 119,
in note. And the case of Austin v.
Austin, 9 Vt. 420, is cited by textwriters as having established the same
rule in that state. But the later cases
there do not admit an unqualified right
of redemption in the mortgagor in this
class of contracts, but, at most, only in
the discretion of the court, and where

the failure to perform the contract has
not been wilful, and is reasonably susceptible of compensation in money:
Hen y v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 358; Olcott v.
Dunklee v. 16 Vt. 478; Tracy v. Hutckins, 36 Vt. 225.
We think it must be obvious to any
one that if there is any class of contracts
where courts of equity would be justified
in holding a firm hand upon claims for
relief from wilful and wanton forfeitures,
it would surely be expected here. We
have said all we desire to say in regard
to the question in Henry v. Tupper, supra,
where the authorities are carefully reviewed, and the same will be found in
our edition of Story's Eq. Jur. J 1326
I. F. R.
a, and note.
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REASIN W. SHAWHAN v. PETER VAN NEST.
* Where the plaintiff, in pursuance of an agreement with the defendant, furnished

the materials and constructed a carriage for the defendant, in accordance with his
order and directions, for which a stipulated price was to be paid, and the defendant
refused to receive and pay for it when completed and tendered-Hdd, that in an
action brought for that purpose, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the contract.

price and interest from the time the money should have been paid.

MoTION for leave to file a petition in error.
The contract between the parties was substantially as follows:
Van Nest, a carriage-maker, agreed with Shawhan, on the 1st of
August 1871, that for seven hundred dollars he would furnish the
materials and make for Shawhan a two-seated carriage in accordance with his directions, and have the same completed and ready
for delivery at Van Nest's shop on the 1st day of October following; in consideration of which Shawhan agreed to accept the carriage at the shop, and pay Van Nest the contract-price for it.
In his petition in the Court of Common Pleas, Van Nest set out
the contract in terms, and averred that he had complied with it in
all respects on his part, and that on the 1st of October 1871, he
tendered the carriage to Shawhan at his shop, and requested him
to accept and pay for it, which he refused to do. Judgment was
VOL. XXIV.-20
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asked for the contract-price, with interest. The answer denied
each and every allegation of the petition.
On the trial, the evidence established the contract and other
allegations of the petition, and also showed that the plaintiff was
still keeping the carriage subject to the defendant's order.
The court instructed the jury that if they found the issues for
the plaintiff, they should give him a verdict for the contract-pXrice
of the carriage, with interest from the time the money should have
been paid. To the charge thus given, no exceptions were taken;
but Shawhan, by his counsel, requested the court to give to the
jury the following special instructions:
"1. If, in this case, the evidence shovs that the defendant
ordered the plaintiff to make for him a carriage, and agreed to take
or receive it, when finished, at the plaintiff's shop; and to pay a
reasonable price therefor, and the plaintiff did, in pursuance of
such order and agreement, make such carriage of the value of seven
hundred dollars, and have the same in readiness for delivery at his
shop, of which the defendant had notice; and the defendant then
failed, neglected, and refused to take, receive, or pay for said carriage, though requested so to do by the plaintiff, these will not
authorize y6u to render a verdict for the plaintiff for the price or
value of the carriage.
"2. If the plaintiff has proved the making of the carriage for
the defendant, and the refusal of the latter to receive and pay for
it, as alleged in the petition, then he can only recover for the
damages or losses he has actually sustained by reason of this
refusal of the defendant, which is the difference between the agreed
price and the actual value."
These instructions the court refused to give, and Shawhan
excepted.
The jury found for Van Nest, and gave him the contract-price
of the carriage, with interest.
Shawhan moved to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, on
the ground that the court erred in refusing to give the instructions requested; which motions were overruled by the court, and
lie excepted; and judgment was entered on the verdict for the
plaintiff.
The case was taken to the District Court, which affirmed the
judgment of the Common Pleas. Shawban now moves this court
for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the
District Court.
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IV. P. Moble, for plaintiff in error.-The measure of damages
in a case like this, is the loss sustained by the vendor on account
of the failure of the vendee to accept and pay for the property
which was the subject of the contract. If the plaintiff's theory,
that the measure of damages is the price of the property, is correct,
it must be because such a iontract as that set forth in the petition,
vests the title of the property contracted for in the defendant, and
passes it from the plaintiff. But the contract set forth in the petition was merely executory, and the petition avers there was no
delivery or acceptance of the goods; so no.title did or could pass
to the purchaser: Ormsbyt v. .Afaclr & .enik, 20 Ohio St.
295; Downer v. Thompson, 2 Hill 137; Hague v. Porter; 8 Id.
141; Moody v. Brown, 34 Maine 107; 10 Bing. 512; Atkins v.
Bell, 8 B. & C. 277; Benjamin on Sales 215; Allen V. Jarvis,
20 Conn. 37; Lang on Sales 476, and cases 6ited; Nixon v;
2Nixon, 21 Ohio St. 114; Doolittle v. Me Cullock, 12 Id. 360;
Sedgwick on Damages 43; 11 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 271; Jones
v. Patton, 3 Ind. 107.

a. -E. Seney, for defendant in error.- The recovery should
be for the contract-price. For the rule when an article is bargained and sold and not delivered, the court is referred to Swan's
Treatise (9th ed.), 590; ifadly v. Pugh, Wright 554; Story on
Sales, sect. 814; Sedgwick on Damages 280; Story on Contracts,
sect. 845; 3 Parsons on Contracts (ed. 1873) 208, 209; 1 Parsons on Contracts 535; Dustan v. llfcAndrew, 44 N. Y. 72. For
a mechanic's remedy, who makes an article to order and his customer refuses to receive it, see Bement v. ,S'mith, 15 Wend. 493;
Thompson v. Alger, 12 Metc. 428.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILMORE, J.-The only question to be determined in this case
is: Did the court err in refusing to give to the jury the special
instructions requested by the defendant on the trial below? The
authorities cited by counsel for the parties respectively, are not in
harmony with each other on this question. Some of those cited
by the plaintiff in error (defendant below) show clearly that, under
the pleadings and practice at common law, there could be no recovery under the common counts in assumpsit, for goods sold and
delivered, or for goods bargained and sold, where no delivery sufficient to pass the title from the vendor to the vendee had been
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made. And further, that in this form of action, proof of a tender
of the goods by the vendor to the vendee, or leaving them with
him against his remonstrance, would not constitute such a delivery
as would pass the title and enable the vendor to recover. While
these may be regarded as settling the rules of pleading and evidence on the trial of particular cases, and therefore not decisive
of the question when raised under issue3 so, formed as to present it
freed from the technicalities of pleading, still there are other cases
cited on the same side, which declare the rule to be as follows:
Where an action is brought by the vendor against the vendee, for
refusing to receive and pay for goods purchased, the measure of
damages is the actual loss sustained by the vendor in consequence
of the vendee refusing to take and pay for the goods, or, in other
words, the difference between the contract-price and the marketprice at the time and place of delivery. In the authorities cited
by the plaintiff in error, no distinction is drawn, or attempted to
be drawn, between the sale of goods and chattels already in existence, and an agreement to furnish materials and manufacture a
specific article in a particular way, and according to order, which
is not yet in existence; the theory being, that in neither case
would the title pass, or property vest in the purchaser, until there
had been an actual delivery, and that until the title had passed,
the vendor's remedy was limited to the damages he had suffered
by reason of the breach of the contract by the vendee, which were
to be measured by the rule above stated. In this case it is not
necessary to determine whether or not a distinction, resting upon
principles of law, can be drawn between ordinary sales of goods
in existence and on the market, aLnd goods made to order in a particular way, in pursuance of a contract between the vendor and
vendee. The case here is of the latter kind, and the question is,
whether the plaintiff below was entitled to recover the contractprice of the carriage, on proving that he had furnished the materials, and made and tendered it in pursuance of the terms of the
contract.
Counsel for the defendant in error (plaintiff below) has cited a
number of authorities, in which the questions presented and decided arose upon facts similar to those in this case, and upon issues
presenting the question in the same way; and as the conclusions
we have arrived at are based upon this class of authorities, some
of them may be particularly noticed.
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In Bement v. Smith, 15 Wend. 493, the defendant employed
the plaintiff, a carriage-maker, to build a sulky for him, for which
he promised to pay $80. The plaintiff made the sulky according
to contract, and took it to the residence of the defendant, and told
him he delivered it to him, and demanded payment, in pursuance
of the terms of the contract. The defendant refused to receive
it. Whereupon the plaintiff told him he would leave it with Mr.
De Wolf, who lived near; which he did, and commenced suit. On
the trial, it was proved the sulky was worth $80, the contractprice. The court charged the jury, that the tender of the carriage
was substantially a fulfilment of the contract on the part of the
plaintiff, and that he was entitled to sustain his action for the price
agreed upon between the parties. The defendant's counsel requested the court to charge the jury that the measure of damages
was not the sulky, but only the expense of taking it to the residence of the defendant, delay, loss of sale, &c. The judge declined to so charge, and reiterated the instruction that the value
of the article was the measure of damages. The jury found for
the plaintiff, with $83.26 damages, being the contract-price with
interest. The charge to the jury was sustained by the Supreme
Court of New York.
In Ballenine et al. v. Bohinson et al., 46 Penn. St. 177, an
agreement was made between the plaintiffs and defendants, whereby
the plaintiffs were to provide materials, and construct for the defendants a six-inch steam-engine, with boiler and Gifford injector
and heater, in consideration whereof the defendants were to pay
plaintiffs $535 in cash on the completion thereof. The plaintiffs
complied with and completed the contract in all respects on their
part, but the defendants refused to pay according to contract. On
the trial, the plaintiffs proved the contract, and the performance
of it on their part, and that the engine was still in their hands.
The defendants' counsel asked the court to instruct the jury,
"that the proper measure of damages in this case is the difference
between the price contracted to be paid for the engine and the
market-price at the time the contract was broken." The court
declined to charge as requested, and instructed the jury that the
measure of damages was the contract-price of the engine, with
interest. There was a verdict for the plaintiffs for the contractprice. The case was taken to the Supreme Court, and the error
assigned was the refusal of the court to give the instructions
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requested by the defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment in the case below. It will be seen that these cases a'e
very similar, and presented the same question, and in the same
manner that the question is presented in this-case. Graham v.
Jackson, 14 East 498, -decides the point in the same way. Mr.
Sedgwick, in his work on Damages, side page 280, in speaking on
this. subject, says: "Where a vendee is sued for non-performance
of the contract on his part, in not paying the contract-price, if the
goods have been delivered, the measure of damages is of course
the price named in the agreement; but if their possession has not
been changed, it has been doubted whether the rule of damages is
the price itself, or only the difference between the contract-price
and the value of the article at the time fixed for its delivery. It
seems to be well settled in such cases that the vendor can resell
them, if he sees fit, and charge the vendee with the difference
between the contract-price and that realized at the sale. Though
perhaps more prudent, it is not necessary that the sale should be
at auction; it is only requisite to show that the property was sold
for a fair price. But if the vendor does not pursue this course,
and, without reselling the goods, sues the vendee for his breach of
contract, the question arises which we have already stated, whether
the vendor can recover the contract-price, or only the difference
between that price and the value of the goods which remain in the
vendor's hands; and the rule appears to be that the vendor can
iecover the contract-price in full."
In Hadly v. Gano et al., Wright (Ohio) 554, the action was
"'assumpsit on a written agreement betyeen the parties, for the
defendants to take all the salt the plaintiff manufactured between
the 2d of June 1831, and the 1st of January-1832, to be delivered
at the landing in Cincinnati, from time to time, as the navigation
of the Muskingum and Ohio should permit, and to pay forty-five
cents a bushel." The plaintiff proved the agreement, and the offer
to deliver to the defendants three hundred aRd fifty barrels of salt,
Avhich the defendants refused to receive. There was an issue in
the case, as to whether the contract had been previously fulfilled
and abandoned by the parties. The court (LANE, J.) charged the
jury that if the contract had not been "fulfilled or abandoned,
and the plaintiff tendered the salt under the contract, which was
refused, he had a right to leave it for the defendants and recover
the value."
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The only case I have examined in which the authorities on this
point are reviewed, is that of Gordon v. -Norris,49 N. Ii. '76.
The case is too lengthy and complicated to attempt to give an
abstract of it here, but the point under consideration was involved;
and although the learned judge criticises the law as laid down by
Mr. Sedgwick, and even 6hows that the authorities he quotes in
support of his position do not sustain him, for the reason pointed
out, yet he says that there is a distinction between the case of
Bement v. Smith and the ordinary cases of'goods sold and delivered, viz., "the distinction between a contract to sell goods then
in existence, and an agreement to furnish materials and manufacture an aticle in a particular way and according to order, which
is not yet in existence." He recognises Bement's case and others
of the same class, as exceptions to the general rule which is to be
applied in the sale of ordinary goods and merchafidise which have
a fixed market value; and in the syllabus of the case the distinction is kept up and stated as follows:
"Where the vendee refuses to receive and pay for ordinary
goods, wares and merchandise, which he has contracted to purchase, the measure of damages which the vendor is entitled to
recover is not ordinarily the contract-price for the'goods, but the
difference between the contract-price and the market-price or value
of the same goods at the time when the contract was broken.
"But when an artist prepares a statue or picture of a particular
person to order, or a mechanic makes a specific article in his line
to order, and after a particular measure, pattern, or style, or for
a particular use or purpose-when he has fully performed his part
of the contract, and tendered or offered to deliver the article thus
manufactured according to contract, and the vendee refuses to
receive and pay for the same, he may recover as damages, in an
action against the vendee for breach of the contract, the full contract-price of the manufactured article."
As has been said, we are not called upon now to determine
whether the distinction as drawn in the clauses quoted, is sound on
principle or not; but be that as it may, we recognise the law
applicable to the case before us as being correctly stated in the
clause last quoted.
. Judge SWAN, in his excellent "Treatise" (10th ed. 780), ir speaking of the effects of a tender upon the rights of the buyer and
seller, and of the damages in such case, says: "The general rule
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in relation to the rights of a seller, under a contract of sale, where
he has tendered the property, and the buyer refuses to receive it,
is this: The seller may leave the property at some secure place,
at or near the place where the tender ought to be and is made,
and recover the contract-price; or he may keep it at the buyer's
risk, using reasonable diligence to preserve it, and recover the
contract-price and expenses of preserving and keeping it ; or he
may sell it, and recover from the buyer the difference between the
contract-price and the price at which it fairly sold." The rule as
thus laid down was first published in 1886, two years after the
decision in Hadly's case, above referred to, which was substantially followed by Judge SWAN in laying it down. It does not
appear that .either the decision or the rule as laid down has ever
before been questioned in Ohio. It will be perceived that Judge
SwAN lays down the rule generally as applicable to all sales of
chattels in the ordinary course of trade, without intimating any
such distinction as that drawn in Gordon v. NVorris. We sanction
and apply the rule in the determination of the particular case before us.' When the plaintiff below had completed and tendered
the carriage in strict performance of the contract on his part, if'
the defendant below had accepted it, as he agreed to do, there is
no question but that he would have been liable to pay the full
contract-price for it, and he cannot be permitted to place the
plaintiff in a worse condition by breaking than by performing the
contract according to its terms on his part. When the plaintiff
had completed and tendered the carriage in full performance of
the contract on his part, and the defendant refused to accept it, he
had the right to keep it at the defendant's risk, using reasonable
diligence to preserve it, and recover the contract-price, with interest, as damages for the breach of the contract by the defendant.
Or, at his election, he could have sold the carriage for what it
would have brought at a fair sale, and have recovered from
the defendant the difference between the contract-price and what
it. sold for.
The court below did not err in refusing to give to the jury the
special instructions requested by the defendant below.
Motion overruled.
The courts have taken difFcrent views,
both as to the appropriate pleadings and
as to the measure of damages in actions

brought by the vendor, in an executory
contract concerning the sale of personal
property, against the vendee for refus-
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Ing to perform his part. Such actions
have been brought either upon the common counts for goods bargained and
sold, goods sold and delivered, work
and labor done and materials furnished,
to recover the full value or contract
price, or upon special counts setting out
the contract, and the breach, by the vendee, in not jerforming it to recover the
actual damages which, in the case of
sales, are measured by the difference
between the contract price and the market value. The propriety of proceed
ing as in the first class of actions mentioned, has been frequently doubted,
whereas the course pursued in the latter,
has been universally approved.
The principal case lays it down as the
rule in Ohio that, "the seller may leave
the property, at some secure place, at
or near the place where the tender ought
to be made, and is made, and recover
the contract price, or he may keep it at
the buyer's risk, using reasonable diligence to preserve it, and recover the
contract price and expenses of preservingi and keeping it, or he may sell it
and recover from the buyer, the difference between the contract price and the
price at which it fairly sold." The
purpose of this note is to see how far
the authorities bear ou the first two
propositions of the rule.
In Girardv. Taggart, 5 S. & R. 19,
which was a special action on the case
to recover the difference between the
price received on a re-sale, and the contract price of tea purchased from the
plaintiff, and which the defendant refused to receive, Ginsos, J., said:
"Properly speaking, the seller cannot
recover the price, when he has retained
the goods in consequence of the buyer's
refusal to comply with any part of the
contract; he recovers damages for the
breach of a contract which was entirely
executory when it was broken, and the.
breach having put an end to every idea
of further performance by either party,
is a violation of the contract in all'its
VOL. XXIV.-21

parts, for which the seller may recover
whatever damages he can'prove he has
* sustained."
The English courts, and those of our
own states that have followed them,
maintain that no action can be brought
for goods bargained and sold, or sold
and delivered, unless the property in
them has actually passed to the vendee,
and this, they hold, cannot be the case
so long as there is something left for the
vendor to do, as to weigh, or select
from a larger lot, or to deliver. While
these things remain undone, the goods
might be taken in execution for the
vendor's debts, or pass to his assignees
in bankruptcy, or he might sell them to
some one else; and, on the other hand,
the vendee could not maintain an action
of trover for them, nor -would he be
liable if they were burned or stolen ;
and for the same reasons in such a case,
an action could not be supported on
counts for work and labor done and
materials furnished, if the materials
belonged to the plaintiff. On the contrary, if the materials had been furnished by the defendant, such action
could be maintained, because the property in the goods would be in him,
and the work and labor would be done
upon his goods directly for his benefit.
When, therefore, the vendee disaffirms
his contract before it has been entirely
performed by the vendor, and the property in the goods passed into the vendee, these courts consider a special
action in the case for damages resulting
from the non-acceptance, to be the
appropriate remedy.
This was the reasoning of the court
in Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 277.
Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered,
bargained and sold, work and labor
done and materials furnished. The defendant, employed B., a patentee, to
have made for them certain machines.
B. employed the plaintiff to make them
under his superintendence. The defendant refused to receive them. The
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court held that none of the counts could
be sustained. So, in Elliott v. Pybus, 10
Dling. 512, defendant ordered the plaintiff to make him a machine, without any
agreement as to price. He paid money
on account when lie saw it complete,
and requested the maker to send it
home. When the machine was tendered, the defendant refused to pay the
price asked and the maker declined to
deliver it except for the full amount.
Subsequently, the defendant said he
would endeavor to raise the money if
they would give him time. The court
were of opinion that the only matter in
dispute being the price, and the defendant having finally acquiesced in it, he had
thereby accepted the machine, and the
.property having passed into him, the
action was properly pleaded. TINDAL,
C.J., said, "a count forgoods bargained
and sold, can only be maintained when
the property in the goods has passed
from the plaintiff to the defendant. * **
The plaintiff cannot sustain his action
for goods bargained and sold, unless
where the defendant is in a condition to
recover the goods in trover, and must
sustain the loss in case of their being
stolen or destroyed by fire." See, also,
Clark v. Spencer, 4 Ad. & E. 460, and
Boswell v. Kilburn, 10 Moore P. C. C.
309. it Gillette v. Hill, 2 C. & M.
535, the converse of the doctrine laid
down in these cases was held true, viz.:
.that a vendee cannot bring trover for
-goods which a vendor refused to deliver,
unless the property in the goods, by
specific appropriation, or otherwise, has
passed to the vendee. In Downer v.
1Thompson, 2 Hill 137, which was assumpsit for goods bargained and sold
and delivered, the plaintiff, sent by a
carrier, two hundred and sixty barrels
of cement, in response to the defendant's order for two hundred and fifty,
.and the latter refused to accept them.
'The court held neither count could be
sustained, because as long as there
remained anything for the vendor to do,
as to count or select goods from a large

parcel, no property passed, and there
was no sale, much less a delivery.
In Hfague v. Porter, .1 Hill 141, the
plaintiff contracted to manufacture a lot
of lamps fbr the defendant, and during
the manufacture he altered them at the
direction of the latter. The plaintiff
delivered them to a car-man, from whom
the defendant refused to receive them,
and the carman left them on the sidewalk. In an action for goods sold and
delivered, the court held that the contract was executory, and that there
having been no actual delivery, the
counts could not be sustained.
So, in Allen v. Jarris, 20 Conn. 50.
Assumpsit for work and labor done
and materials furnished.
Defendant,
the patentee, ordered the plaintiff to
manufacture twenty patent surgical
adjusters, and directed him to stop
before they were completed. The court,
citing Atkinson v. Bell, held that the
materials being those of the plaintiff,
and the work and labor having been
done on hts own property, the proper
remedy was an action on the case to recover damages suffered front the act of
the defendant, in preventing the completion of the contract, the measure of
damages to be as always in such cases,
the difference between the contract and
market price or the price obtained on a
resale, which in the particular instance
of patented articles, would be the same
as the contract price.
In Jifood. v. Brown, 34 Me. 107,
counts were filed for goods sold and delivered, and materials and labor furnished. The plaintiff made, tendered
and left against his remonstrance, at the
shop of the defendant, stereotype plates
ordered by him. The court held neither
count sustained, because the property in
the goods did not pass to the vendee
without an acceptance upon his part, and
that he could not be sued for the value
unless he had the property.
The case of Gordon v. Norris is sufficiently set out in the principal case. It
fully sustains the Luthorities already
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cited, but introduces ai~exception in the tiff could recover for this reason upon
case of articles to be made to order in a the special counts, but riot upon the
particular way, as portraits, statues, common counts. Considered in this light,
clothing, &c., and that have no market the case is not an exception to the prinvalue, for which it is said the measure ciple that property must have passed in
of damages is the full contract price. order to recover the price, because the
But the fact that the difference between court held that property had passed.
-the market value and the contract price Whether tender does amount to delivery
is the full contract price makes these might be open to doubt.
In Dustan v. McAxdrew, 44 N. Y.
cases no exceptions, if the amount is recovered as damages and not as the price 1872, EARLE, Ch. Com., divides the
contracted for. Even portraits-witness proper remedies for the disappointed
that of the collector of Boggly Wallah vendor in substantially the same way as
-have some market value, and if they -was done in the principal case.
" 1. He may store or retain the prohave none, then all that can be said is
that the difference between the contract perty for the vendee and sue him for the
price and the market value equals the entire purchase price.
"2. He may sell the property, acting
contract price.
In OrmAby v. Thacher and Renick, 20 as agent for this purpose, of the vendee,
Ohio 301, the declaration was for a recover the difference between the conbargain and sale of eight thousand tract price and the price obtained on
bushels of corn. The corn was to be such resale.
paid for on delivery. The court held
"3. He may keep the property as his
the contract to be executory, and that own and recover the difference between
the delivery in the future repelled the the market price at the time and place
idea of property passing to the purchaser of delivery and the contract price."
But the case actually decided was one
at the date of the contract. The facts
of this case aro not very clearly stated, of a resale within the second class of
but if it were a suit for the contract the remedies mentioned by the court,
price, it would seem entirely inconsist- which has never been doubted. The
ent with the principal case. See, also, opinion cites Sedgwick and Parsons,
in support of these views, Story on Con- who certainly do confirm it in toto, but
tracts 1035; Story on Sales 314, and the cases cited-Lewis v. Greider, 49
Barb. 606; Pollen v. LeRoy, 30 N. Y.
Smith on Contracts 331.
We will conclude by an examination 549-were also cases of resale of the
of the cases relied upon by the court and goods upon the refusal of the vendee to
accept them. Nothing in either case,
the counsel for the defendant in error.
Badly v. Gano, Wright (O.) 554, was except one sentence occurring in the
a Nisi Prius case, and what the judge opinion of ENxOvT, J., gives color to
said is taken from his remarks to the the position taken by EARLE, Com., in
jury. It is certainly not strengthened the first kind of the remedies, viz. :
as the decision of a point of law by the "A vendor in such a ease may, if he
fact that the jury, in finding against the choose, abandon the property, treat it as
the vendee's, and sue the latter for the
plaintiff, did not adopt any measure of
damages at all. In Bement v. Smith, 15 price."
7liompsbn v. Alger, 12 Mete. 428, cerWend. 493, there were special counts
setting out the contract and alleging tainly supports the position of the plaindelivery, also a general count for work tiff in error. It was assumpsit to reand labor done and goods sold. The cover the price of one hundred and
court held that the tender amounted to eighty shares of stock, or damages for
the refusal of the purchaser to perform
delivery, and pointed out that the plain-
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the contract.
The shares had been * instead of taking and paying the price,
transferred to the defendant, upon thc they requested the plaintiffs to sell it.
books of the company, before he had re- In such a case, the right of property was
pudiated the contract. The court held * clearly in them on notice of the comthat this act had vested the property in pletion of the article, and the matehim, and that, therefore, he might be rials of which it was composed, may
sued for the price, but that if he had re- fairly be said to have been delivered
pudiated the contract before the transfer, when they were put into the engine."
the gbneral rule as to soles would have
In Laubach v. Laubach, 73 Penna.
applied, and he would have been liable 392, SlnUEswooD, J., says : " The
to an action for the damages only. As plaintiff in error supposes that the same
it happened, the stock had no value at rule is applicable in this case as in the
the time the contract was made, and ordinary case of the refusal of
a vendee,
therefore the difference between the con- before any title to the property has
tract price and market value was the full passed to him, to accept goods which he
contract price. But, as we have already had previously agreed to buy. The auremarked, the fact that in any ease the thorities which have been cited, abundamount recovered would be exactly the antly show that there the measure of
same, whichever measure of damages damages is the difference between the
were employed, does not affect any prin- contract and the market price, at the
ciple of law making one measure right time of the refusal or breach." Ballenand the other wrong.
tine v. Robinson, bad been cited at bar.
In Ballentine v. Robiason, 10 Wright See, also, Sedgwick on Damages 280 ;
177, STRONG, J., regarded the property Story on Contracts,
845 ; 3 Parsons
in the engine a s having passed into the on Contracts 208.
It must be admitted that Balentine v.
vendee. If this were so, then it would
be in line with Atkinson v. Bell and all Robinson and Benent v. Snit; and the
the cases following it. " Yet where the principal case, can only be reconciled
subject of sale is a specific article,
with what appears to be the general
where the contract has been so far com- line of the authorities, by saying that in
pleted as to pass the property in the them, tender by the vendor, or conduct
article to the vendee, the possession be- amounting to an acceptance upon the
ing retained only because the price is part of the vendee, was considered to
not paid, there seems to be no good have passed the property in the goods to
reason why the vendor should not be the latter. In the contract upon which
permitted to recover the agreed value. the principal case was brought, the
* * * Ie has parted with the property
plaintiffs? shop was fixed as the place
and given the full equivalent for the of delivery, and it might be argued that
stipulated price. His right to the pro- the completion of the carriage, at the
perty having passed to the vendee, his time and place appointed, amounted to
right to the price would appear to be delivery. But tlhe unqualified position
consummate. * * * The present is not laid down in the rule that when the
strictly the case of a sale. The plain- vendee refuses to accept the goods upon
tiffs agreed to build the engine according tender, the vendor may store or retain
to directions of the defendalhts, and to them and sue for the contract price,
furnish the necessary materials for it. though adopted by Sedgwick and ParWhen it was completed the defendants sons, does not seem borne out by the
had notice and were bound to take it authorities.
H. G. W.
away, and pay the contract price, but
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Supreme Court of the United States.
M. M1.WELTON

r. TIE STATE OF MISSOURL

A license tax required for the sale of goods is in effect a tax upon the goods
themselves.
A statute of Missouri which requires the payment of a license tax from persons
who deal in the sale of goods, wares and merchandise which are not the growth,
produce or manufacture of the state, by going from place to place to sell the same
in the state, and requires no such license tax from persons selling in a similar
way goods which are the growth, produce or manufacture of the state, is in conflict with the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states.
That power was vested in Congress to insure uniformity of commercial regulation against discriminating state legislation. It covers property which is transported as an article of commerce from foreign countries, or among the states, from
hostile or interfering state legislation until it has mingled with and become a part
of the general property of the country, and protects it even after it has entered a
state from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin.
The inaction of Congress in prescribing rules to govern inter-state commerce is
equivalent to its declaration that such commerce shall be free from any restrictions.

IN error to the Supreme Court of Missouri. The facts are
stated in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
FIELD, J.-This case involves a consideration of the validity
of a statute of Missouri discriminating in favor of goods, wares
and merchandise which are th growth, product or manufacture
of the state, and against those which are the growth, product
or manufacture of other states or countries, in the conditions
upon which their sale can be made by travelling dealers. The
plaintiff in error was a dealer in sewing machines, which were manufactured outside the state of Missouri, and went from place to
place in the state selling them without a license for that purpose.
For this offence he was indicted and convicted in one of the circait
courts of the state, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $50, and
to be committed until the same was paid. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the state the judgment was affirmed.
The statute under which the conviction was had declares that
whoever deals in the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, except
books, charts, maps and stationery, which are not the growth, product or manufacture of the state, by going from place to place to
sell the same, shall be deemed a pedlar; and then enacts that no
person shall deal as a pedlar without a license, and prescribes the
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rates of charge for the licenses, these varying according to the
manner in which the business is conducted, whether by the party
carrying the goods himself on foot, or by the use of beasts of burden, or by carts or other land carriage, or by boats or other river
vessels. Penalties are imposed for dealing without the license prescribed. No license is required for selling in a similar way-by
going from place to place in the state-goods which are the growth,
product or manufacture of the state.
The license charge exacted is sought to be maintained as a tax
upon a calling. It was held to be such a tax by the Supreme
Court of the state; a calling, says the court, which is limited to
the sale of merchandise not the growth or product of the state.
The general power of the state to impose taxes in the way of
licenses upon all pursuits and occupations within its limits is admitted, but like all other powers must be exercised in subordination to the requirements of the Federal Constitution. Where the
business or occupation consists in the sale of goods, the license tax
required for its pursuit is in effect a tax upon the goods themselves.
If such a tax be within the power of the state to levy, it matters
not whether it be raised directly from the goods, or indirectly from
them through the license to the dealer. But if such tax conflict
with any power vested in Congress by the Constitution of the
United States, it will not be any the less invalid because enforced
through the form of a personal license.
In the case of Brown v. 31aryland,12 Wheaton 425, 444, the
question arose whether an act of the legislature of Maryland requiring importers of foreign goods to pay the state a license tax
before selling them in the form and condition in which they
were imported, was valid and constitutional. It was contended
that the tax was not imposed on the importation of foreign goods,
but upon the trade and occupation of selling such goods by wholesale after they were imported. It was a -tax, said the counsel,
upon the profession or trade of the party when that trade was
carried on within the state, and was laid upon the -5ame principle
with the usual taxes upon retailers, or innkeepers, or hawkers and
pedlars, or upon any other trade exercised within the state. But
the court in its decision replied that it was impossible to conceal
the fact that this mode of taxation was only varying the form without varying the substance, that a tax on the occupation of an importer was a tax on importation, and must add to the price of the
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article and be paid by the consumer or by the importer himself in
like manner as a direct duty on the article itself. Treating the
extraction of the license tax from the importer as a tax on the
goods imported, the court held that the act of Maryland was in
conflict with the Constitution; with the clause prohibiting a state,
without the consent of Congress, from laying any impost or duty
on imports or exports, and with the clause investing Congress with
the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
So, in like manner, the license tax exacted by the state of Missouri from dealers in goods which are not the product or manufacture of the state, before they can b6 sold from place to place
within the state, must be regarded as a tax upon such goods themselves. And the question presented is, whether legislation thus discriminating against the products of other states in the conditions
of their sale by a certain class of dealers is valid under the Constitution of the United States. It was contended in the state
courts, and it is urged here, that this legislation violates that clause
of the Constitution which declares that Congress shall have the

power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states. The power to regulate conferred by that clause
upon Congress, is .one without limitation; and to regulate com-

merce is to prescribe rules by which it shall be governed, that is,
the conditions upon which it shall be conducted; to determine how
far it shall be free and untrammeled; how far it shall be burdened
by duties and imposts, and how far it shall be prohibited.
Commerce is a term of the largest import; it comprehends intercourse for the purposes of trade in any and all its forms, including the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities between the citizens of our country and the citizens or
subjects of other countries, and between the citizens of different
states. The power to regulate it embraces all the instruments by
which such commerce may be conducted. So far as some of these
instruments are concerned, and some subjects which are local in
their operaaion, it has been held that the states may provide regu-

lations until Congress acts with reference to them. But where the
subject to which the power applies is national in its character, or
of such a nature as to admit of uniformity of regulation, the
power is exclusive of all state authority.

It will not be denied that that portion of commerce with foreign
countries and between the states, which consists in the transporta-
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tion and exchange of commodities, is of national importance and
admits and requires uniformity of regulation. The very object of
investing this power in the general government was to insure this
uniformity against discriminating state legislation. The depressed
condition of commerce and the obstacles to its growth previous to
the adoption of the Constitution, from the want of some single
controlling authority, has been frequently referred to by this court,
in commenting upon the power in question. "It was regulated,"
says Chief Justice MARSHALL, in delivering the opinion in Brown
v. Marsyland, 12 Wheaton 422, 444, "1by foreign nations with a
single view to their own interests, and .our disunited efforts to
counteract their restrictions were rendered impotent by want of
combination. Congress, indeed, possessed the power of making
treaties, but the inability of the Federal government to enforce
them became so apparent as to render that power in a great degree
useless. Those who felt the injury arising from this state of things,
and those who were capable of estimating the influence of commerce on the prosperity of nations, perceived the necessity of
giving the control over this important subject to a single government. It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding
from the feebleness of the Federal government contributed more
to that great revolution which introduced the present system, than
the deep and general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress." 12 Wheaton 446,
The power which insures uniformity of commercial regulation
must cover the property which is transported as an article of
commerce from hostile or interfering legislation, until it has mingled with and become a part of the general property of the country,
and subjected like it to similar protection, and to no greater burdens. If at any time before it has thus become incorporated into
the mass of property of the state or nation, it can be subjected to
any restrictions by state legislation, the object of investing the
control in Congress may be entirely defeated. If Missouri can
require a license tax for the sale by travelling dealers of goods
which are the growth, product or manufacture of other states or
countries, it may require such license tax as a condition of their
sale from ordinary merchants, and the amount of the tax will be a
matter resting exclusively in its discretion.
The power of the state to exact a license tax of any amount
being admitted, no authority would remain in the United States or
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in this court to control its action, however unreasonable or oppressive. Imposts operating as an absolute exclusion of 'the goods
would be possible, and all the evils of disdriminating state legislation, favorable to the interests of one state and injurious to the
interests of other states and countries, which existed previous to
the adoption of the Constitution, might follow, and the experience
of the last fifteen years shows would follow, from the action of
some of the states.
There is a difficulty, it is true, in all cases of this character, in
drawing the line precisely where the commercial power of Congress
ends and the power of the state begins. A similar difficulty was
felt by this court in Brown v. Maryland,in drawing the line of
distinction between the restriction upon the power of the states to
lay a duty on imports and their acknowledged power to tax persons and property, but the court observed that, though the two
were quite distinguishable when they did not approach each other,
yet, like the intervening colors between white and black, approached so nearly as to perplex the understanding, as colors perplexed the vision in marking the distinction between them, yet
that the distinction existed and must be marked as the cases arose.
And the court, after observing that it might be premature to state
any rule as being universal in its application, held that when the
importer had so acted upon the thing imiported that it had become
incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it had lost. its distinctive character as an import and become
subject to the taxing-power of the state, but that while remaining
the property of the importer, in his warehouse in the original form
and package in which it was imported,.the tax upon it was plainly
a duty on imports, prohibited by the Constitution.
Following the guarded language of the court in that case we
observe here, as we observed there, that it would be premature to
state any rule which would be universal in its application to determine when the commercial power of the Federal government
over a commodity has ceased and the power of the state has commenced. It is sufficient to hold now that the commercial power
continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of
discriminating legislation by reason of its foreign character.
That power protects it, even after it has entered the state, from
any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin. The act of
VOL. XXIV.-22
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Missouri encroaches upon this power in this respect, and is, therefore, in our judgment, unconstitutional and void.
The fact that Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific
rules to govern inter-state commerce does not affect the question.
Its inaction on this subject, when considered with reference to its
legislation with respect to foreign commerce, is equivalent to a
declaration that inter-state commerce shall be free and untrammeled. As the main object of that commerce is the sale and
exchange of commodities, the policy thus established would be
defeated by discriminating legislation like that of Missouri.
The views here expressed are not only supported by the case of
Brown v. Af1arflfand, already cited, but also by the case of Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wallace 128, 9 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 25, and
State Freight Tax, 15 Wallace 232. In the case of Woodruff v.
Parham, Mr. Justice MILLER, speaking for the court, after observing with respect to the law of Alabama then under consideration, that there was no attempt to discriminate injuriously against
the products of other states or the rights of their citizens, and
the case was not, therefore, an attempt to fetter commerce among
the states, pr to deprive the citizens of other states of any privilege or imnlunity, said: "But a law having such operation would,
in our opinion, be an infringement of the provisions of the Constitution which relate to those subjects, and, therefore, void."
The judgment must be reversed arid the cause remanded, with
directions to enter a judgment reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court and directing that court to discharge the defendant.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
FREDERICKSBURG AND POTOMAC RAILROAD CO. v. CITY OF
RICHMOND.
A grant in a legislative charter of a railroad of a right to fix its terminus at a
point within the limits of a municipal corporation, to be approved by the council,
and the subsequent approval of the point of terminus by the council, will not be
taken to constitute an irrevocable contract, or to deprive the corporation of its

proper and legal control over the use of its streets, unless such is the effect of an
express grant or a necessary implication from the charter.
It is within the ordinary and implied powers of a municipal corporation to regnlate the kind of vehicles and the speed at which they may be used in traversing
its streets.

F. & P. RAILRO AD CO. v. CITY OF RICHMOND.
Such regulation is a part of the police power of the state, delegated to the municipal corporation as the custodian of its streets, and is not an exercise -f eminent
domain for which compensation is to be mad* to the parties affected.
Where the terminus of a railroad, within the limits of a municipal corporation,
-as under itscharter submitted to the Council and approved, and subsequently the
growth of the city changed the character of the street whereon the terminus was
located, an ordinance prohibiting the use of steam engines upon certain portions of
the street, including the point where the terminus of the railroad was located, was
held valid.

ERRoR to the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond, affirming a judgment of the Police Justice of said city, imposing a fine upon the plaintiff in error for running its ears, propelled by steam, upon Broad street,
in violation of a city ordinance.
The ordinance was as follows:
9"Be it ordained by the Council of the city of Richmond, that section
three of an ordinance passed Mlay 13th 1872, entitled an ordinance to
regulate the use of Broad street by the Richmond, Fredericksburg and
Potomac Railroad Company, be amended and re-ordained so as to read
as follows: I Sect. 3. That on and after the 1st day of January 1874,
io car, engine, carriage, or other vehicle, of any kind, belonging to or
used by the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company,
shall be drawn or propelled by steam upon that part of the railroad or
railway track, on Broad street, east of Belvidere street, in said city.
The penalty for failing to comply with this section shall be not less than
tne hundred, nor more than five hundred dollars for each and every
offence, to be recovered before the Police Justice of the city of Richinond."'

The plaintiff in error (the railroad company) admitted the violation
of this ordinance, but contended that it was invalid, because in violation
of its chartered rights.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHRISTIAN, J.-The legislature, by an act providing a charter for
the city of Richmond, approved May 24th 1870, vested in the Council
of said city, the power "To prevent the cumbering of streets, avenues,
walks, public squares, lanes, alleys or bridges, in any manner whatsoever;" and the power "To determine and designate the route and grade
of any railroad to be laid in said city, and to restrain and regulate the
rate of speed of locomotives, engines and cars, upon the railroads within
said city, and may wholly exclude said engines or cars if they please,
provided no contract may be thereby violated."
It is insisted by the counsel for the railroad company, that this provision of the charter of the city of Richmond cannot be executed against
it, because it is excluded from its operation by the proviso, inasmuch
as, by its charter, it has the right by contract for ever, and under all
circumstances, to run its oars by steam through the whole length of
Broad street, to its depot and terminus, at the corner of Eighth and
Broad streets.
The question, therefore, we have to determine, is whether the ordinance of the City Council is void and invalid, because it is in violation
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of the chartered rights of the said railroad company, and therefore
violates the obligation of the contract between the state and the said
railroad company, as evidenced and declared by said charter of incorporation.
We are, therefore, called upon to examine carefully the provisions of
that act, and to determine whether the state has by an ever-continuing
contract committed itself for all time to this railroad company, to run
its cars propelled by steam through the heart of the capital city of the
Commonwealth, and through the most important and populous street of
that city, without regard to the safety, comfort and convenience of its
citizens, and without regard to the general prosperity and welfare of the
whole city.
The Richmond, Fredericksburg and.Potomac Railroad Company was
incorporated by an act of the legislature of 'this state, passed February
25th 1834.
This act provided that, under the direction of certain persons, therein
named, books should be opened at Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
other places, "for the purpose of receiving subscriptions to the amount
of seven hundred thousand dollars, in shares of one hundred dollars
each, to constitute a joint capital stock, fir the purpose of making a
railroad from some point within the corporation of Richmond, to be approved by the Common Council, to some point within the corporation
of Fredericksburg, and for the purpose of extending the same, should
the company hereby incorporated, at the commencement of the work, or
at any time afterwards, deem it advisable to do so, from its termination
within the town of Fredericksburg to the Potomac river, or some creek
thereof, and for providing everything convenient and necessary for the
purpose of transportation on the same." Sess. Acts 1834.
The only other section of the act (which comprises thirty-eight sections) necessary to be referred to, is the twenty-fourth section, which is
as follows:
"Sect. 24. The president and directors, or a majority of them. shall
have power to purchase with the funds of the said company, and'place
on the railroad constructed by them under this act, all machines,
wagons, vehicles, carriages, and teams of any description whatsoever,
which they may deem necessary and proper for the purposes of transportation."
These are the two sections of the act upon which the railroad campany relies to show that the ordinance of the City Council is void and
invalid as to it, because they create a contract, which is perpetual,
with the state, permitting them to run their engines for all time on
Broad street. These two sections will be considered more particularly
presently.
The record further shows that, on the 22d of December 1834, at a
meeting of the president and directors of the Richmond and Ferdericksburg Railroad Company, the following preample and resolutions were
adopted:
"Whereas, by the act incorporating this company, it is requisite that
the point at which this railroad terminates within the corporation of
Richmond should be approved by the Common Council, and it appears
to the board most expedient to conduct the same from the Richmond
turnpike along H. street (now Broad street), to a point at or near the
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intersection of the said street and Eighth street, and for the present to
terminate the same by suitable connections with the contemplated warehouses and workshops of the company on lots Nos. 477, 478, purchased
by them from John Heth. Therefore, be it resolved, that the approbation of the City Council be requested to the above plan. Resolved,
that the president cause a copy of the foregoing resolutions to be transmitted to the City Council."
In response to these resolutions of the president and directors of the
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company, the City
Council, on the 23d of December 1834, adopted the following preamble
and resolution:
" Whereas, by a resolution of the president and directors of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company, submitted to
the Common Council, it appears that it is deemed most expedient by
the president and directors to conduct the said railroad from the Richinond turnpike along H. street, to a point at or near the intersection of
said street and Eighth street, and for the present to terminate the
same by suitable connections with the contemplated warehouises and
workshops of the company, on lots Nos. 477, 478, purchased by them
from John Heth. Resolved, that the Common Council do approve the
proposed location of the said railroad, and the present termination of the
same as described in the foregoing resolution, and authorize the prosecution of the said work within the limit of the city, on the above location,
provided that, in locating the said railroad, no injury shall be done to
the water-pipes, now laid in and along said street; provided, further,
that the corporation of Richmond shall not be considered as hereby parting with any power or chartered privilege not necessary to the said railroad company for constructing said railroad, and connecting the same
with the depot of said company within the limits of the city."
These proceedings of the City Council, and the two sections of the act
of incorporation above quoted, constitute the foundation of the claim, on
the part of the railroad company, of a perpetual and irrepealable contract between the state and that company, by which, for all time and
under all circumstances, they may run their cars, propelled by steam,
through one of the principal and most populous streets of the capital
city of the Commonwealth.
It will be conceded, that if such contract exists at all, it originated
in the two sections of the act of incorporation and proceedings thereunder above quoted. These, therefore, require a careful and candid consideration.
It is apparent that, by the first section of the act incorporating the
railroad company, the legislature delegated to the City Council of Richmond the power to select the terminal point within the corporate limits
of the city; and under this act the railroad company could only locate
its terminus at such point within the city of Richmond as should be
approved by the City Council.
This plain construction of the first section is recognised and acted
upon by the president and directors of the railroad company, when they
declare, in the resolutions adopted by them, and sent to the City Council, that "it is requisite that the point at which the railroad terminates
within the corporation of Richmond should be approved by the City
Council."
And the City Council, in approving the terminal point suggested by
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the president and directors of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company, adopted it (the intersection of Eighth and Broad
streets) as the (thou) "present termination of the same," and upon the
express condition " that the corporation of Richmond shall not be considered as heroby parting with any power or chartered privilege not
necessary to the railroad company for constructing said railroad, and
connecting the same with thc depot of said company, within the limits
of the city."
Upon this construction of the first section and with these plainly ex.
pressed conditions, asserting in emphatic terms the chartered powers
and privileges of the corporation of the city of Richmond, the railroad
company adopted the corner of Eighth and Broad streets as the terminal
point within the city of Richmond, from wlich they should build their
road, and on which they built their depot and warehouses, &c
In the resolutions approving the terminal point (without which approval the railroad company could not have commenced their work
beginning within the corporation of Riciuopd) we find the express and
potsitive reservation of all the chartered righlts and powers of the municipality.' These included an absolute and entire control over the streets
of the city, excepting only the privilege to the railroad company of constructing and connecting their road with the depot on Broad street.
Not a syllable is recorded about the mode or manner of transportationwhether by horse-power or steam-the entir regulation of that subject
beiug reserved to the corporation with the rest of its chartered powers.
It is argued, however, that the twenty-fourth section of the act of incorporation above quoted, giving to the company the power" to purchase
and place upon their road all machines, vehicles, &c., of any description
whatsoever, which they may deem necessary and proper for the purposes
of transportation," confers upon the company the authority to run locomotives within the city limits. This reasoing is altogether inconclusive and illogical. If the assent of the City Council had been absolute
and unconditional, this view would not have !been sound. It is manifest
that the twenty-fourth section is a general i provision extending to the
whole road. The road passes through tihe counties of Ilenrico, Hanover,
Caroline, and Spottsylvania. The- legislature did not require these
counties to give their assent to the constrIuction of the road, because
these counties have no chartered rights and. privileges, and in these
counties the railroad company acquired not only a right of-way, but an
absolute right of property in their road, and necessary property acquired
in those counties, because, as empowered by their charter they condemued the lands of individuals fbr their purposes, and paid them an
equivalent in money; but the legislature did require the assent of the
city authorities before the company could lawfully pass its boundaries.
Within the limits of the city of Ricihmond all the right which this
company acquired was the right of way over the street for transportation
of passengers and freight. This right was subject to the right inherent
in the municipal authorities to control the use of the streets and to protect the safety, comfort, and general welfare of the citizens of the municipality. The general right, therefore, to use machines on their road,
as provided in the twenty-fourth section, does not embrace the rihit,
against the consent of the city authorities, to use locomotives on one of
the principal and most populous streets of the city.
It is worthy of remark, that the City Council have, ever since the
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approval of the terminal point in 1839, constantly asserted their right
to prohibit the introduction of steim engines into the city. In 1845,
after much contention for years on the subject between the railroad
company and the city authorities, on motion of Mr. Wickham, one of the
most distinguished citizens, as well as one of the most learned lawyers
of the city, the following resolution prepared by imwas adopted by the
City Council:
"Resolved, that the Council of the city of Richmond not only maintains itsright to prohibit the use of locomotives within the city whensoever"itshall appear expedient to do so, but in contradiction to all allegatin to the contrary, they do most positively deny all responsibility to
indemnify the railroad company for any such exercise of its legitimate
pqwers. They admit no other right in this respect on the part of that
company but to a favorable and indulgent consideration-a claim which,
from its nature becomes less and less the longer it is favored."
Up to the present time, the City Council have repeatedly and constantly asserted their right to prohibit the use of locomotives within
the city limits, which they might or might not exercise in their own
discretion, according as the safety and welfare of the citizens should
require.
This right was as firmly maintained and confidently asserted under
the general chartered powers, and the rights inherent in every municipal
corporation to guard and protect the safety of the citizens, and to regulate the use of the streets of the city, from the very inception of the
construction of the railroad, as it is now when, by the amended charter
above referred to, special power is conferred upon the City Conuneil to
regulate the'rate of speed of locomotives, engines and cars upon the
railroads within the city, and to wholly exclude said engines and cars
if they please, " provided no contract will be thereby violated."
But the railroad company confidently rely upon this proviso, and it is
earnestly argued that the adoption by the legislature of this proviso was
a recognition of the claim of the railroad company to run their locomotives on Broad street for all time. This pretension is unreasonable and
illogical. The only fair and legitimate inference to be drawn from the
adoption of this proviso is,
that the legislature, aware of the controversy
between the city authorities and the railroad company on this subject,
left it as an open question for the courts to decide whether the chartered
powers and privileges of-the corporation of Richuond had been so
modified and restricted by the act incorporating the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company as to deprive the corporate
authorities of the right to prohibit the company from running steamengines on the streets of the city. This question was not intended to
be decided by the legislature, but was reserved as a judicial question.
The legislative declaration by the amended charter was simply that the
City Council should have power to regulate the speed of locomotives,
and remove the:m altogether, if in so doing no c,,ntract was violated;
and the question as to the violation of the contract rights of the company is, by that proviso, submitted to judicial determination; and that
is the main question now submitted to this court.
Now it must be borne in mind that when the act incorporating the
Richmond, Fredericksburr and Potom-ic Railroad Company was passed
by the legislature in 1839, the charter of the city of Richmond was
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then in existence, and certainly none of the provisions of that charter
were repealed by the adoption of the act incorporating tile railroad company, but remained in full force and effect. By the charter of the city
tile corporate authorities are invested with the power to "make and
establish such by-laws, rules and ordinances, not contrary to the constitution or laws of the Commonwealth, as shall by them be thought necessary for the good ordering and government of such persons as shall from
tine to time reside within the limits of s'id city and corporation, or
shall be concerned in interest therein." Not only were they invested
with these chartered rights, specifically conferred by the terms of
charter, but with all these powers and privileges which by law are inherent in every municipal corporation, to guard the safety and promote the
comfort and welfare of the citizens of the corporation.
The railroad company accepted their charter, not only subject to existing laws and chartered corporate powers vested in the corporation of
Richmond, but they adopted the terminal point of their road within the
corporate limit approved by the City Council with the express reservation, "that the corporation of Richmond shall not be considered as
parting with any power or chartered privilege not necessary to the railroad company for constructing the said road " &c.
It'is conceded, that a charter granted to a corporation by the state
may be, according to its terms, a contract between the state and corporation, the obligation of which cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation, but at the same time, while this is conceded, it is also certainly
true, that corporations, like natural persons, are subject to remedial
legislation and amenable to general laws. Private corporations, even
without any express reservation of the powers over them by the legislature in their charters, are subject, like individuals, to be restrained,
limited, and controlled in the exercise of tleir powers, by such laws as
the lerislature may pass, based upon the principles of safety to the
public.
It is well settled, and cannot now be disputed, that the legislature
may control the action, prescribe the functions and duties of corporations, and impose restraints upon them, to the same extent as upon
natural persons, subject of course to the limitation of not impairing the
obligation of contracts made between the corporation and the state.
See Redfield on Railways 428 and notes, and cases there cited.
A corporation, in the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, " is the mere creature of
the law; it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence;" and as was expressed by the same great judge, in Providence
Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, " any privileges which may exempt a
corporation from the burdens common to individuals, do not flow necessarily from the charter, but must be expressed in it, or they do not
exist."
A cardinal rule, in the interpretation of: charters of incorporation, is
thus laid down by Mr. Justice GRIER, in Richmond Railway Company
v. Louisa Railway Company, 13 How. 71, "Public grants are to be
construed strictly, and any ambiguity in the terms of the grant must
operate against the corporation, and in favor of the public, and the corporation can claim nothing but what is clearly given by the act."
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In ChrIcs River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters 548, Chief
Justice TA-SEY, enforcing the same rule, said, "The continued existence
of a government would be of no great value if, by implications and presumptions it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the
ends of its creation, and the functions it was designed to perform transferred to privileged corporations;" and this eminent jurist concludes
his discussion of the -subject by the declaration, "that no claim in any
way abridging the most unlimited exercise of the legislative power over
persons natural or artificial can be successfully asserted except upon the
basis of an express grant, in terms or by necessary implication."
Applying these rules of law and canons of interpretation to the charter
of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company, it is
clear that there is nothing in the privileges and franchises conferred by
that charter which prevents the legislature, either of itself, or through a
municipal corporation to which it has delegated its authority, from prescribing rules and regulations for the exercise of these privileges and
franchises. And it is equally clear that the authority granted in the
charter of incorporation to construct a road " from a point within the
corporation of Richmond, to be approved by the City Council, to a point
within the corporation of Fredericksburg," and the authority to place
upon said road machines and other vehicles necessary for thepurposes
of transportation, do not constitute a contract, by which the said company may, for all time, run their engines upon Broad street, within
the corporation of Richmond, and which perpetually prohibits legislative interference and control. Nor, upon the most liberal rules ofinterpretation, can it be said, that the charter has conferred such extraordinary and unlimited powers upon this corporation, either "by. express
grant in terms or by necessary implication." Certainly there is no such
express grant in the charter of incorporation. It cannot be impiied from
the fact that one of its terminal points is to be within the corporate
limits of Richmond. The power to lay its track and move its cars
through one of the streets of the city does not necessarily imply the
power to move them by steam; nor does the authority to use steam
engines on their road necessarily imply a perpetual grant for all time to
run steam engines through the most populous streets of the city.
To give to the charter such an interpretation would be to hold not
only that the legislature had deliberately violated the chartered rights
of the principal and capital city of the Commonwealth, by depriving it
of the power to protect the public safety and promote the public weltre,
but that the le'gislature had tied its own hands, and placed this corporation above and beyond the reach of the law. Before we can reach such
a conclusion we must see in the charter itself, either an expre3s grant
in terms, or one which arises from the most patent and necessary impli.
cation. Seeing neither, I am forced to the conclusion that it was competent for the legislature to confer upon the City Council the power "to
regulate the rate of speed of locomotives, engines and cars upon the railroads within the city of Richmond, and to wholly exclude said engines
if they please," and that the ordinance passed in conformity with this
act is valid.
Nor do I perceive that this ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive,
and for that reason, as was argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error, ought to be set aside.
VOL. XXIV.-23
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This company was chartered more than forty years ago. At that
time, much of what is now known as Broad street was a mere* turnpike,
neither graded nor paved, with, scattered here and there, houses on each
side. It is now one of the most attractive and populous streets in the
city; it being the most level and the widest street, and one most couvenient to that part which contains the largest number of private residences. Broad street has now become the principal street, for the shops
and retail business of this city. There is not only on this street a large
and constantly growing resident population, but crowds are attracted to
it every day, and all hours of the day, from all parts of the city, especially ladies and children, from the fact that this street has now become
the great mart for supplying the wants of families, in the varied and
multiform retail business necessary to meet the wants of a populous and
growing city.
It is not therefore "unreasonable" that the City Council should, under this change of circumstances, prohibit the use of steam engines on
this street.
The voluminous evidence taken in this case not only shows that these
locomotives have had the effect to injure the business and geneial prosperity of this principal street, and consequently of the whole city, but
it is also proved that, notwithstanding the great care and watchfulness
with which this railroad has been managed, the use of steam power has
'been the occasion of many fearful accidents,
And under the general police power inherent in every municipal cor-poration (independent of the special powers iconferred by the legislature,
"'to regulate the rate of speed" of their engines, "or to remove them
if they please") the City Council might well exercise this authority.
This general police power existing in the 'legislature is transferred to
-every municipal corporation, to be exercised by it for the protection of
the safbty and general welfare of the citizens of such corporation ; and
in the exercise of such authority the municipal legislature (the City
Council) must of necessity be invested with a very large discretion. See
0gden, v. Sanders, 12 Wheat. 270; Forbes v. Hamburg, 2 Grant (Pa.)
291 ; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 ; Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5
Cush. 442.
As was said by Mr. Justice BARBOUR, in City of New York v. Mibze,
11 Peters 139, in speaking of the general police power of a state: -By
-virtue of this it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn
duty of a state to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its
people, and 'provide for its general welfare by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to these ends, where the
power over the particular subject or the manner of its exercise is not surTreudered or restrained. All those powers which relate to merely municipal
legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police,
-re not thus surrendered or restrained; and consequently in relation to
these the authority of the state is complete, unqualified and exclusive."
This police power, says Chief Justice REDFIELD, in T7oTpe v. Railread a ., 27 Verm. 149, "extends to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property
within the state. It must, of course, be within the range of legislative
action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use
his own as not to injure others."

F. & P. RAILROAD CO. v. CITY OF RICHMOND.

The same eminent judge and author says, in his valuable work on the
Law of Railways: " There are confessedly certain essential franchises
of such corporations (railroad companies) which are not subject to legislative control ; and at the same time it cannot be doubted that these
artificial beings or persons, the creations of the law, are equally subject
to legislative control, and in the same particulars precisely as natural
persons. Railroads-so far as the regulation of their own police affecting the public safety, both as to life and property, and also the general
police power of the state as to their unreasonable disturbance of. and
interference with, other rights, either by noise of their engines in places
of public concourse, as in the streets of a city, or damage to property,
either in public streets or highways-there can be no question whatever
are subject to the right of legislative control :" 2 Redf. on Railw., § 232.
And again, referring to the case of Buffalo and NiagaraFalls Railway
v. City of Buffalo, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 109, the author says: "It has been
held that a statute giving power to a Common Council of a city to regulate the running of cars within the corporate limits authorizes the
adoption of an ordinance entirely prohibiting the propelling of cars by
steam through any part of the city. We should entertain no doubt of
the right of the municipal authorities of a city or large town to adopt
such an ordinance without any special legislative sanction, by virtue of
the general supervision which they have over the police of their respective jurisdictions." Such must have been the opinion of the court
in the case last referred to. NELSON, Chief Justice, says : "A train of
cars impelled by the force of steam through a populous city may expose
the inhabitants and all who resort to it, whether for business or pleasure, to
unreasonable perils ; so much so that, unless conducted with more than
human watchfulness, the running of the cars (in that mode) may well
be regarded as a public nuisance :" Id., § 250, p. 646.
In Pierce on American Railroad Law, the doctrine on this subject is
thus succinctly and clearly laid down under the head of Police Laws:
"A railroad company, although no power is reserved to amend or repeal
its charter, is nevertheless subject, like individuals, to such police laws
as the legislature may from time to time enact for the protection and
safety of citizens and the general convenience and good order. These
laws, although imposing liabilities and duties on the company other than
those contained in its charter, or existing when it was granted, do not
impair the obligations of the contract implied therein.
" Its property and essential franchises are indeed protected by the
Constitution, but the company itself is not thereby placed above the
laws. It seems hot to have been the design of that instrument to disarm the states of the power to pass laws t9 protect the lives, limbs,
health and morals of citizens, and to regulate their conduct towards each
other. Such laws may incidentally impair the value of franchises or
of rights held under contracts, but they are passed diverso intuitu, and
are not within the constitutional inhibition."
Without multiplying authorities on this point, I will simply refer to
the following cases: Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cowen 349; Cowle- v.
.Mayor of N. Y., Cowen 585; Bahn v. Boston, 12 Pick. 194; 10 Barb.
245; 45 Me. 560; 5 Hill 209.
But it is insisted by the learned and able counsel for the appellants,
that the ordinance of the City Council complained of takes from the
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company one of its essential franchises, and seriously affects their
rights of property without compensation, and is therefore void and
invalid.
It has already been shown that, upon a fair construction of the charter of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Riailroad Company,
there was no contract, either express or implied, by which the state
bound itself, for all time and under all circumstances, to permit the company to run its locomotives through the streets of the city, and that the
ordinance violated no contract rights of the company.
Does it violate any essential franchises, and does it appropriate any
property of the company? Clearly not. The ordinance does not prevent the company from maiking its connections with the depot on Broad
street, but only regulates the mode by which these coniections are to be
made. It only declares that these connections shall not be made by
steam. It only says to the company that the public safety and the general welfare of the city, in the opinion of the City Council (who are competent .to judge of this matter, as the municipal legislature): requires
now that the locomotives shall no longer traverse this most important
street, because it exposes the inhabitants to unreasonable and constant
perils, and seriously affects the prosperity of the whole city. In doing
this the City Council are acting within their legitimate powers. They
have violated no chartered rights ; they havoe interfered with no essential franchise. Nor can the railroad company claim any compensation ;
for in so doing the City Council have not appropriated for the public
use one dollar of the property of the company. It may be the company
may, in a certain sense and to some extent, be the loser by this ordinance; but upon well established principles they have no claim to compensation, because there is here no appropriation of the company's property
or violation of its essential franchises, but only a regulation of the mode
in which their chartered rights and franchises may be exercised; and
the company, like natural persons, must be subject always (unless protected by chartered rights or constitutional iuhibition) to the salutary
and all-pervading maxim of the law-sic utere tuo ut alnumLnon edas.
The law is well established by indisputable authority and the universal
assent of an enlightened jurisprudence, that every person (artificial as
well as natural) holds his property subject to the limitatiou expressed
by this maxim, exercised either by the legislature directly or, by public
corporations to which the legislature may delegate it. Laws and ordinances relating to the safety, comfort, health, convenience, good order,
and general welfare of the inhabitants are comprehensively styled Police
Laws or regulations. And it is well settled, that laws and regulations
of this character, though tliy may disturb the enjoyment of individual
rights, are not unconstitutional, though no provision is made for conipensation for such disturbances.
They do not appropriate private property for public use, but simply
regulate its use and enjoyment by the owper. If he suffers injury, it
is either damnum absque iqjuria, or, in the' theory of the law, he is compensated for it by sharing in the general benefits which the regulations
are intended and calculated to secure. The citizen owns his property
absolutely, it is true; it cannot be taken from him for any private use
whatever without his consent, nor for any public use without compensation. Still he owns it subject to this restriction, namely, that it must
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be so used as not to injure others, and that the sovereign authority may,
by police regulations, so direct the use of it that it shall not prove pernicious to his neighbors or to the citizens generally. These regulations
rest on another maxim-salits populi stqrenu est lex. This power to
restrain a private injurious use of property is very different from the
eminent domain. Under the latter compensation must always be made.
But under the former, it is not a taking of private property for public
use, but a salutary restraint of a noxious use by the owner contrary to
the maxim, Sic tere tue ut alienu von ldas. See Dillon on Municipal Corporations. Vol. i., pp. 209, 210, and cases there cited.
In Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 85, Oh. J. SHAW, in an able and
exhaustive opinion, in which the police power, as contradistinguished
from the right of eminent domain, is discussed and is particularly appliea.
ble to this case, says, "We think it is a settled principle, growing out of
the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to
the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the cominunity. * * * * Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment
as shall prevent them front being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the Constitution,
may think necessary and expedient. This is very different from the
right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use whenever the public exigency
requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation tlhcrcitor... The power we allude to is rather the police
power-the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to make,
ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, and not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the Commonwealth and of the subjects of the same."
There are many cases in which such a power is exercised by all wellordered governments, and where its fitness is so obvious as to be recognised by all as reasonable and proper. Such are the laws to prohibit
the use of warehouses for the storage of gunpowder near habitations or
highways, to restrain the height to which wooden buildings may be
erected in populous neighborhoods, and require thei to be covered with
slate or other incombustible matter; to prohibit buildings from being
used for hospitals for contagious diseases, or for the carrying on of noxious
or offensive trades; to prohibit tme raising of a dam, and causing stag.
nant water to spread over meadows near inhabited villages, thereby
causing noxious exhalations injurious to health and dangerous to life.
And so, upon precisely the same principle, a railroad company may be
prohibited from running their cars propelled by steam through the
crowded streets of a populous city, thereby subjecting property to
serious injury, and human life to constant and unreasonable perils.
Nor does the prohibition of the noxious use of property, although it
may diminish the profits of the owner, make it an appropriation to a
public use, so as to entitle the owner to compensation. If the owner

